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   Introduction  
Although U.S. farmland values have been studied with numerous land price models, a farmland valuation 
puzzle still remains (Moss and Katchova, 2005). The results of traditional economic models of farmland 
prices demonstrate that farmland value is determined by discounted future returns to farmland (Alston 
1986; Burt 1986; Featherstone and Baker 1987), but there are issues unexplained in those models.  
First, farmland values exhibit significant short term boom-bust cycles that are not explained by the asset 
value formulations. The results of Schmitz (1995) and of Falk and Lee (1998) indicate that the values of 
agricultural assets are determined by market fundamentals in the long run, but in the short run farmland 
prices diverge significantly away from the discounted value, and these diverged periods are referred to as 
boom or bust cycles. Actually, more literature report the overreaction of farmland values in response to 
increases in returns (Featherstone and Baker 1987; Irwin and Coiling 1990; Falk 1991; Clark et al. 1993; 
Schmitz  1995).  Second,  while  the  direction  of  changes  in  farmland  values  is  consistent  with  the 
capitalization formula, farmland appears to be systematically overpriced. Farmland returns are considered 
too low comparing with other sectors in the capital market when justified through the capital asset pricing 
models using their asset values.  
Farmland values make up 75 percent of the U.S. agriculture assets, therefore the farmland valuation 
puzzle is an important problem that stimulates plenty of researches in the field. Scholars have long been 
trying  to  identify  the  possible  causes  for  boom-bust  cycles,  such  as  quasi-rationality  or  bubbles’ 
(Featherstone and Baker 1987), time- varying risk premiums (Hanson and Myers 1995), overreaction 
(Burt 1986; Irwin and Coiling 1990), fads (Falk and Lee 1998), and risk aversion and transaction costs 
(Just and Miranowski 1993; Chavas and Thomas 1999; Lence and Miller 1999; Lencc 2001). Further, 
researchers have also explored potential arbitrage barriers for overpriced farmland values, such as the 
absence of short selling and transaction costs make arbitrage quite risky (Chavas 2003; Lence 2003; 
Miller 2003).  The resolutions to the farmland valuation puzzle are interlaced with the issue of market fundamentals in 
the stock-pricing literature. Irwin and Coiling (1990) use a variance-bounds test proposed by Shiller 
(1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) to analyze whether the volatility in farmland prices was consistent 
with the variability in returns to farmland. They find that the variability in the return to farmland was 
potentially larger than that implied by the variability of farmland prices, but this methodology may have 
suffered  from  nonstationarity’  in  data  series  (Kleidon  1986)  and  small-sample  bias  (Flavin  1983). 
Campbell and Shiller (1987) develop the test of the present-value model to deal with nonstationary data. 
Falk (1991) uses this methodology and he does not find a stationary relationship between farmland values 
and returns to farmland. Hanson and Myers (1995) find that some variation in farmland values can be 
explained by a time-varying-discount rate, which illustrate the possible effects of  nonfundamentals on 
farmland prices. 
Falk and Lee (1998) apply the methodology proposed by Lee (1998) to examine farmland prices and they 
find that fads and overreactions relevant to short-run pricing behavior, while permanent fundamental 
shocks to long-run price movements.  
Barry, Robison, and Neartea (1996) allow for the effects of risk and risk aversion on asset prices. Using a 
CAPM  model,  Shiha  and  Chavas  (1995)  uncovered  statistical  evidence  that  transaction  costs  have 
significant effects on land prices. Epstein and Zin (1991) use a nonadditive nonexpected utility based 
CAPM and find that risk aversion is important to farmland pricing. Kocherlakota (1996) discovers that 
incomplete  markets  and trading  costs  could also  be  relevant to the  equity-premium  puzzle. Just and 
Miranowski (1993) develop a structural model of farmland prices and find that inflation-rate and real 
returns on alternative uses of capital changes may cause changes in farmland values. Chavas and Thomas 
(1999) adopt the Epstein and zin (1991) framework in a dynamic land pricing model and both find risk 
aversion and transaction costs are important to the farmland prices. Lence (2001) cautions about the data 
stationary in Just and Miranowski (1993) and the deduction in Chavas and Thomas (1999). Plantinga et 
al. (2002) decompose agricultural land values through a spatial city model into components reflecting the discounted value of future land development and the discounted value of agricultural production, which 
counts for 91% of the overall US farmland values. Fontnouvelle and Lence (2002) find robust evidence 
that the behavior of land prices and rents is consistent with the CDR-PVM in the presence of empirically 
observed  values  of  transaction  costs.  However,  under  the  assumption  of  fixed  relative  risk  aversion 
coefficient, the existing literatures have not fully addressed the farmland valuation puzzle. 
The  objective  of  this  essay  is  to  develop  general  dynamic  land  price  models  (DLPM)  through  the 
introduction of farm wealth levels, to enhance model robustness against risk aversion misspecifications. 
To be specific, our model generates reasonably accurate predictions for land prices, supposing that the 
risk aversion changes geographically and temporally (Gomez-Limon, Arriaza, and Riesgo, 2002). 
Chavas and Thomas (1999) adopted the framework of Epstein and Zin (1991) and developed a DLPM 
that incorporates risk aversion, transaction costs, and dynamic preferences, which they applied to 1950-96 
U.S. land values. Their model generates very good fitting of data, but the estimation of parameters is not 
stable over time and this diminishes the prediction power of the model. This essay extends the work of 
Chavas  and  Thomas  by  assuming  that  consumption  has  nonlinear  functional  forms  and  therefore 
including both return rate and wealth levels in the land pricing model. Intuitively, farm wealth levels are 
related to relative-risk-aversion-coefficient (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1965), and risk aversion affects land 
prices (Just and Miranowski, 1993). Consequently, the omission of farm wealth levels makes traditional 
pricing models especially vulnerable to risk aversion misspecifications.  
We  expect  our  empirical  results  to  be  consistent  with  the  major  findings  of  existing  capitalization 
formula. Although most present value models are rejected by empirical data, and the persistent low return 
rate of farm sector is linked to farmland overpricing and admission of market failure, we believe that risk 
aversion misspecification is the missing key to the farmland valuation puzzle in those models. First, we 
test the hypothesized nonlinear homogeneous relationship between farmland return and wealth in our 
model with US data, and expect a significantly nonlinear relationship. Second, we compare the restricted and unrestricted models. We expect that the linear (restricted) estimation of risk aversion coefficient is 
significantly lower than that of the nonlinear (unrestricted) model, which helps to explain the apparently 
overpriced farmland through risk aversion misspecifications in traditional DLPM. Third, we expect better 
out of sample prediction of our model. Last, our model provides evidences of the structural relationship 
between farm wealth and the farm land prices, with the return impacts controlled in the model. Our 
general DLPM formula sheds light on the effect of both farm returns and wealth on farmland values 
through the general homogeneity assumption. 
This essay will provide researchers a valuable framework in asset pricing because it develops a general 
DLPM  that  nests  traditional  models  as  its  special cases.  Our  findings  will  benefit  both  farmers  and 
developers with more accurate forecasts on farmland prices. 
The essay proceeds as following: Section II contains a discussion and derivation of the model estimated in 
GMM. Section III details the construction of data, the estimation and testing procedures. Section IV 
illustrates the actual empirical results. Section V summarizes and concludes the essay. 
 
   The Model 
We  build  our  model  with  well  accepted  set  ups  for  C-CAPM  models.  We  consider  the 
optimization problem facing a representative consumer, whose goal is to maximize his utility 
through his choices of levels of consumption and allocations of his portfolio among various 
assets each period (Mankiw and Shapiro, 1986). 
At period t, the consumer’s  assets     =     ,    ,    , …,    ) are consisted with two parts: 
riskless assets,    , and risky assets, (   ,    , ...,   ), and they come from two possible sources: 
assets maintained from last period,      , and new investments in the assets,    = (   ,    , 
   , ...,    ). The relationship is expressed as the following: 
(1)          ,   +     
    k = 0, 1, 2,…, K. 
At period t, consumers have the options to consume    and to make investment   . Under the 
assumption  of  rationality,  the  consumers  are  supposed  to  maximize  their  utilities  in  their 
consumption and investment decision. Therefore it is reasonable for us to assume that the the 
consumer’s  budget constraint is binding and denoted as following: 
(2)       ,           ,   ,…,  ,                       ∑                    
 
      
Where         ,     ,....,       is differentiable return function for risky assets, and   is the 
interest rate for riskless assets in period t. The function             in equation (2) represents the 
unit transaction cost of buying or selling asset    . We discuss 3 scenarios for     according to 
the sign of    . 
(3)               
    0    if       0, 
                  0                 if        0, 
                    
    0     if        0 
We  suppose  that  both  the  buyers  and  sellers  have  to  pay  a  positive  fee  which  would  be 
transferred to third parties in order to close the deal, so both   
 , transaction cost for buying, and 
  
 ,  transaction  cost  for  selling,    are  positive,  though  they  may  not  be  the  same  due  to 
asymmetry, which could pose a problem to the continuity of     at point 0. This transaction costs 
structure reflects a situation where transaction costs reduce the income of all market participants 
and discourages them from participation. 
We then assume a recursive utility framework following Koopmans (1960) 
(4)           ,    ,    ,…             ,      |     
where       |    is an aggregator of future consumption certainty equivalent given information 
   . 
Following Epstein and Zin (1989,1991), we further assume the following: 
(5a)        1       
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                      1                  log    , 
                            for      0 
 (5b)            |             
   
 
  
if 0       1, 
=exp    log           if α=0 
Where        1/ 1       , and    is the rate of time preference.          1   1/ , and    is the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution.   is the relative risk aversion coefficient of the consumer 
(Epstein and Zin 1989, 1991). When     1, the consumer is risk neutral and the higher the value 
of   the more risk averse is the consumer, and vice versa. One interesting special case of equation (5) is that when              0, equation (5) reduces to 
the familiar expected time-additive utility specification 
       1                
 
   
  /  
We would test the hypothesis             0 in our estimation results section to see if the US 
farmland data support time-additivity in utility function. 
Assuming      ,  ,         is  differentiable  and  bounded  for  all  feasible     ,  ,   ,  the 
optimization problem of consumption and investment decision could be written as the following:  
(6)          
  max      ,         :equations  1  and  2   
  max
  
       ,                    ,                            ,    
 
   
 
    ,              
where          is the indirect objective function. Under differentiability assumptions, the first-
order necessary conditions for    are  
(7a)       :    /    /        /        /       (7b)       :
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Noticing that we leave the case that        0 out of our deduction due to 2 reasons. First, the 
functional form in equations (8) at        0  is disputable according to Lence (2001). Second, in 
the data set for estimation, we do not have any data point with        0, which could bear a 
nearly 0 possibility in the reality.  
Apply the envelope theorem to equation (6) at points of differentiability, we have  
(8a)    
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   ,   
             
  
                   if         0  
According to equation (5b), we use implicit function form theorem to get  
     /         
          
         /     . 
Substituting equation (8a) and (8b) into equation (7a) and (7b), 
(9a)    
  
   
 /        /       
          
      /        1         /      
(9b)   
 
  
   
            
  
     /         
          
      /                 /       
                    ,        ,     /            if        0  If we substitute (9a) into (9b), and assume         1, we get the standard time-additive model 
under risk neutrality, which we would also test in our estimation section. 
(10)                            /          ,        ,    /           1        /       Specification: 
Equation (9a) and (9b) are the Euler equations at optimal price dynamics, but we could not use 
them directly to estimate future farmland prices because part of the structures is not observed. In 
this section, we show how to further specify the structures of equation (9a) and (9b) through 
testable assumptions and deduct an empirical system from them. 
Assume the consumer’s aggregated wealth level at period t and t-1,    and     , as following 
(11a)            ∑               ·
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From equation (2) we can get 
(12)            ,           ,   ,…,  ,              ∑               
 
      
We can rewrite equation (12) as the following 
(13)               1   
  , 
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  , 
  ,   
    ,   
 
     
ASSUMPTION  A1.  The  return  function        ,   ,…,    is  linear  homogenous  in 
    ,   ,…,    . 
ASSUMPTION A2. The consumption function         is homogenous of degree   in At-1  or          H. D. O. λ. 
We can then write the consumption function as 
(14)         ·     
  
Use Taylor expansion we can rewrite (14) as 
(15)                
      
 ! ·         ·          
      
 ! ·                   
(i) when 0       2,     1     0        ∞. 
(ii)     is bounded, so        is also bounded.  Therefore 
        
 !   0        ∞. 
Due to (i) and (ii), we can find an integer N, such that 
               
     1 
1!
·         ·      … 
     1  
 !
·          ·           
Where     0.00001 
Thus, we can write the following 
(16)           ·       1  
     
 ! ·         ·      … 
      
 ! ·          ·       
Define     
   
     
, under the assumption A2, Equation (14) could be rewritten as: 
     
 
  ·    ·       Together with (17), we can find 
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Together with (13), we can find 
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Equation (18) is very important, and we use it to derive the key value for our homogeneity test. 
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From equation (5), we can find 
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for  0≠ <1 
Under Assumption A2, we have         ·     
   
            ,                         ,       
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  Notice the second term is self-adjusting to the relationship of         , if we assume linear 
expectation operator. 
We can have            ,                ,    
(20)                              ,     
              ,    
             
From equation (5), we can apply the envelope theorem and get the following: 
(21)     
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Together with (20), we can have 
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Rearrange equation (22) under the assumption that         at optimum, we have 
(23a)          
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Rewrite equation (5a), we can get the following 
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Substituting from equation (23a)               
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Therefore the following part could be substituted using equation (24), (25), and (26) 
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Rearrange equation (28a) and (28b) we get an estimable GMM moment functional form for our 
empirical model: 
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Equation (29a) and (29b) are the two equations of our general homogeneity model, and all the 
variables used are defined as following: 
￿              : t q    Consumer Price Index(1982~1984:1)   ￿              : t y    disposable income of farm population ($trillion)   
￿              : t R   gross rate of return on farm equity 
￿              : t A    farm wealth levels (equity) ($100million)   
￿            : t r     interest rate on U.S. treasury bills(%)   
￿            : t p     Farm land price($100,000/acre)   
￿          : / 1 kt t a + p   net farm income per acre ($1000/acre)   
￿           t v :   transaction costs of year t in farmland market 
￿           t Q :  land quantity at time t 
 
When we set l to 1, equation (29a) and (29b) reduces to the linear homogeneity model: 
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In spite of slight notation differences, our linear homogeneity model is the same as that of Model 
M1 in Chavas and Thomas (1999). 
   Data and Estimation 
The above model is developed for a reprehensive consumer and we assume that all the functional 
forms would sustain with aggregated data. As defined in the equations, all the data are collected 
from USDA data set in 1950~2008 at US aggregated level.  




Both the linear homogeneity model and the general homogeneity model are estimated with two-
stage GMM procedure. Hansen (1992) shows that an asymptotically efficient or optimal GMM 
estimator of parameter vector could be obtained by choosing weight matrix so that it converges 
to  the  inverse  of  the  long-run  covariance  matrix.  In  the  first  stage,  we  calculate  an  HAC  – 
Newey-West  weighting  matrix,  which  is  a  heteroskedasticity  and  autocorrelation  consistent 
estimator of the long-run covariance matrix based on an initial estimate of the parameter vector. 
First, we calculate the initial parameter estimates of the nonlinear system with two-stage least 
squares  estimation  by  iterated  convergence.  Second,  we  use  2SLS  estimates  to  obtain  the 
residuals, and third, we obtain estimates of the long-run covariance matrix of the instrument-
residual matrix, and use it to compute the optimal weighting matrix. In the second stage, we 
minimize the GMM objective function with the optimal weighting matrix obtained in stage 1 
with  respect  to  parameter  vector.  The  non-linear  optimization  for  the  parameters  iterates  to 
convergence of 0.0001 and updates parameter estimates from the initial 2SLS estimates to the 
final  2-stage  GMM  estimates.  Further,  for  the  HAC  procedure,  we  specify  that  the  data  is processed  with  prewhitening  by  VAR(1)  and  we  choose  Bartlett  kernel  and  Newey-West 
bandwidth. 
Instruments  
In our two-stage GMM estimation, we use identical instrument vector for both equations in the 
system.  In  the  linear  homogeneity  model,  we  estimate  a  five  element  parameter  vector 
( , , ,   ,  ), with five different instruments (1, Pt-1, yt/yt-1, qt/qt-1, Rt-1). Since we have two 
equations in the linear homogeneity model, the real instrument number used is ten (two times 
five), which determines the degree of freedom of overidentifying test in our linear homogeneity 
model to be five, ten (number of instruments) minus five (number of parameters). Similarly, we 
estimate a six element parameter vector ( , , ,   ,   , ), with seven different instruments (1, 
Pt-1, yt/yt-1, qt/qt-1, Rt-1,    , Liabilityt) in our general homogeneity model. Therefore the degree of 
freedom of overidentifying test in our general homogeneity model is eight, fourteen (number of 
instruments) minus six (number of parameters).  
Estimation 
The GMM estimations are reported in Table 2 for both linear homogeneity model and general 
homogeneity model. Although estimations are basically consistent between two models, there 
are some very interesting differences.  
First,  the  general  homogeneity  model  yields  a  much  higher  estimate  for  r than  the  linear 
homogeneity  model,  which  indicates  that  the  intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution, 
) 1 /( 1 r s - = , is much higher under the general homogeneity model. The linear homogeneity 
model estimate for  r is 0.754, and the corresponding intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
 ) 1 /( 1 r s - = ,  is  4.0650,  very  close  to  4.10,  the  estimate  of  Chavas  and  Thomas  (1999). 
However,  the  general  homogeneity  model  estimate  for  r and  s   are  0.9586  and  24.1546 
respectively. This results show that agents in the farmland markets are even more flexible in 
income substitution between time periods than tradition C-CAMP predicts.  
Second, the estimates of transaction cost parameters, Cp and Cm, in the linear homogeneity 
model are both insignificantly positive, which is close to the results from Chavas and Thomas 
(1999). The estimate of booming market transaction parameter, Cp, in the general homogeneity 
model is 0.1136 with standard error of 0.0568, positive and significant at 5% level, while that of 
the diminishing market, Cm, is -0.0074 with standard error of 0.0045, negative and marginally 
significant at 10% level. These results show that transaction costs,   , remain positive regardless 
the  increasing  or  decreasing  of  farmland  quantity.  On  one  hand,  the  opposite  signs  of  the 
transaction cost parameters in the general homogeneity model are more intuitive in line with the 
real world phenomenal. After all, both the buyers and sellers of farmland need to pay transaction 
costs, such as advertisements, research, legal fees, and so on. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect 
positive aggregated transaction costs in both booming and diminishing markets. On the other 
hand, these results eliminate transaction costs as one of the major drivers in the farmland market. 
Agents make decisions of buying or selling farmland always in presence of positive transaction 
costs, even though the magnitude of diminishing market parameter seems to be much smaller 
than that of the booming market. The magnitude difference is sensible because when the market 
is diminishing, agents become more cautious and this leads to an increase in market efficiency. 
The transaction amount decreases, and only the most economically efficient deals are closed in 
the market, which yields much lower transaction costs in aggregation. In short, the transaction 
costs affect farmland market, but not as significantly as a driving force. Third,  the  general  homogeneity  model  yields  a  much  higher  estimate  for  a than  the  linear 
homogeneity model, which indicates that the risk aversion coefficient of the farmland market 
participants could be much higher than the traditional model predicts, or farmers are much less 
risk averse than we thought. We follow Epstein and Zin (1991)’s definition of risk aversion 
coefficient:  agents  are  risk  neutral  when  their  a =1,  and  become  more  risk  averse  when  a
decreases and vice versa. It is worth noticing that traditional time series models generate one 
single  estimate  of  a   in  the  whole  period  of  study  based  on  aggregated  data.  It  is  well 
documented that risk aversion could differ materially across different agent groups, according to 
elements  such  as  age,  income,  education,  health,  and  other  geographical  variables.  In  other 
words, the estimate of  a  is probably more like a baseline rather than a sensible average of 
agents’ risk aversion coefficient. Even under the assumption of representative agent, the estimate 
of a  needs extra cautions, because the risk aversion level for the same agents could change over 
time due to the changes of their geographical variables. It is apparent that other factor(s) should 
be included in the consideration of risk aversion in order to explain a certain year’s land price 
data or to make a reasonable prediction of near future. In our general homogeneity model, we 
introduce wealth level, approximated by the farmers’ equity, as a remedy to the embedded risk 
aversion coefficient misspecification problem in CAPM.  
Fourth, and probably the most important, we find that the estimate of  , homogeneity degree of 
consumption  and  value  function,  is  0.8277,  with  standard  error  of  0.0034.  This  finding  is 
consistent  with  several  previous  assumptions  we  make  about   .  First,     is  positive  and 
significant, meaning that consumption is a valid increasing function of last period’s wealth level, 
therefore, so is value function. In other words, this result provides empirical evidence to the 
hypotheses that agents’ wealth level affects their future consumptions and utilities. Second, the magnitude of the estimate is between 0 and 2, showing that the nonlinear homogeneous function 
of yt(At-1) could be closely approximated by a linear functional form as equation (16). This result 
reinforces the validity of our homogeneity test, which is derived from equation (18). Third, the 
estimate of   is less than 1, indicating that our data better support a nonlinear rather than a linear 
homogenous functional form of consumption. This also illustrates the necessity of a  general 
homogeneity model in farmland pricing. 
In addition, the objective function value, reported as J-stat, are low for both models: 0.1085 for 
linear homogeneity model and 0.2460 for general homogeneity model. The estimates for   and   
are both close to 1 in both models, and they are consistent with the findings of Chavas and 
Thomas (1999). The R-squared are close between the linear homogeneity model and general 
homogeneity model, but they  are both significantly lower than that of  Chavas and Thomas 
(1999), which could be caused by the persistent farmland price rise since 1997, and especially 
the sharp rise since 2004. The general homogeneity model has a slightly higher R-squared in 
equation  (29b),  0.3350  than  its  counterpart,  0.2345,  in  the  linear  homogeneity  model  (30b), 
meaning that the general homogeneity assumption helps to explain the variance in US farmland 
prices.  This  result  is  intuitive  since  we  add  one  more  parameter:   ,  homogeneity  degree  of 
consumption, to estimate in equation (29b), whose estimate turns out to be significantly different 
from 1, which unsurprisingly increases the explanation power of the general homogeneity model 
in farmland pricing. 
Hypothesis testing 
The GMM estimates are tested and results are reported in Table 4 for both linear homogeneity 
model and general homogeneity model. Both models pass the over identification test with very high  p-values,  supporting  the  overall  validity  of  the  instrument  variables.  With  insignificant 
parameter estimates, the linear homogeneity model fails to reject both the No transaction costs 
hypotheses  and  the  Symmetric  transaction  costs  hypotheses,  while  the  general  homogeneity 
model estimates reject the No transaction cost hypotheses at 1% level and reject the Symmetric 
transaction  costs  hypotheses  at  5%  level.  In  other  words,  US  farmland  data  do  not  provide 
evidence  against  the  No  transaction  costs  hypotheses  in  1950~2008  period  as  Chavas  and 
Thomas find in the 1950~1996 period with the linear homogeneity model. 
As to the expected utility hypotheses, the linear homogeneity model fails to reject the null: (  
=1), while the general homogeneity model shows that   is close to but statistically bigger than 1. 
Both  models  provide  evidence  of  the  advantage  of  “consumption  smoothing”  over  “income 
smoothing” in the effects of risk aversion. The almost-equal-to-1   estimates are both in favor of 
the dynamic consumption-based CAPM model. The difference is that the linear homogeneity 
model shows that the estimate of  r is not statistically different from that of a , while the general 
homogeneity model indicates that  a  is close to but bigger than  r , which provide empirical 
evidence against the traditional expected time-additive utility specification.  
r  and  a  are both found significantly different from 1 at 1% level by Chavas and Thomas 
(1999) with the linear homogeneity model. In our GMM estimation,   r  is significantly different 
from 1 at 1% level, and  a  is marginally different from 1 at 10% in the linear homogeneity 
model, and both insignificantly different from 1 in the general homogeneity model. A possible 
explanation is that with the highly aggregated data, the estimations of intensively preference 
related  variables  such  as  intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution  and  risk  aversion  coefficient could be interpreted as a boundary or frontier of individual or subgroup observation values rather 
than the average of them. 
Our linear homogeneity model estimation fails to reject the 0 rate of time preference hypotheses 
null (  =1) as Chavas and Thomas (1999) did. But the general homogeneity model estimates find 
strong evidence against 0 rate of time preference: Chi-square= 147.7758 and p-value=0.0000, 
which is consistent with Chavas and Thomas (1999).  
A  last  hypothesis  testing  reported  in  Table  4  is  the  linear  homogeneity  test  for  our  general 
homogeneity model. The null hypothesis is that   =1 or the consumption is a linear homogeneity 
function of previous wealth level. The chi-square statistics is 2518, indicating that homogeneity 
degree of consumption is significantly less than 1.  This test supports the necessity of general 
homogeneity model and helps to explain the better performance of the  general homogeneity 
model comparing to the linear homogeneity model. 
Homogeneity Test 
Both  the  linear  homogeneity  model  and  the  general  homogeneity  model  are  built  on  the 
assumption A2: consumption yt is a homogeneous function of previous wealth level At-1. It is 
important to check if this assumption is supported by data used for estimation in both models to 
verify  the  specification  of  the  functional  forms  and  therefore  the  validity  of  the  parameter 
estimations. 
From equation (18), we define that  
Delta=left side –right side    
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It is obvious that Delta should be close to 0 if the homogeneity assumption holds; otherwise it 
indicates that data used in estimation do not support homogeneity at the estimated degree. 
Figure 1 shows the calculated Delta values for both linear and nonlinear (general) homogeneity 
model. As we can see, the nonlinear homogeneity model with degree of 0.8277 yields delta 
values ranging from -0.5 to 1.2, which is acceptable considering the noises in data and errors in 
estimation. However, the linear homogeneity model yields delta values ranging from 1 to 24.5, 
suggesting that US farm data fail to support the linear homogeneity assumption. 
Robustness 
In order to further explore the validity of our general homogeneity model, we also estimate it 
with full information Maximum Likelihood and 3 Stage Least Squares. Table 3 demonstrates the 
estimations of general homogeneity model with all 3 methods: GMM, ML, and 3SLS. Out of 
total seven parameters estimated, the magnitude and significance level for six parameters are 
stable  across  all  3  methods,  and  the  only  difference  is  that  the  estimates  of  parameter  for 
transaction  cost  in  booming  market  are  insignificant  with  ML  and  3SLS,  but  significantly 
positive at 5% level with GMM. 
These results indicate that our estimates of the general homogeneity model are not sensitive to 
estimation methods. The functional forms adopted in the estimation are reasonable and robust 
against structural misspecifications, while the estimates are reliable and useful in predictions. Predictability 
To  test  the  reliability  of  out-of-sample  predictions  of  our  models,  we  perform  recursive 
predictions with both linear homogeneity model and general homogeneity model, and compare 
them with the true data of farmland prices during 1997~2008. The recursive predictions are made 
through a repeated procedure. First we use all the data from year 1950 to year n to obtain GMM 
estimations ( , , ,   ,   ,     )n of a model, and we use ( , , ,   ,   ,    )n and data needed in the 
functional  form  (b)    to  predict  pn+1,  the  farmland  price  of  year  n+1.  Then  we  repeat  this 
procedure for year n+1 to predict the farmland price in year n+2, and so on. 
Figure 2 shows the comparison results of linear homogeneity model and general homogeneity 
model with observed value of farmland price from 1997 to 2008. As we can see, among all 12 
years’  predictions,  the  general  homogeneity  model  always  performs  better  than  the  linear 
homogeneity model because the nonlinear predictions are always closer to the observed values 
than the linear predictions. Except for four years: 1998, 2003, 2004, and 2007, when the two 
predictions  are  close,  the  nonlinear  predictions  are  significantly  higher  than  the  linear 
predictions, which helps to explain the alleged farmland overpricing puzzle. 
This result is also consistent with the higher R-squared for the general homogeneity model when 
compared to the linear homogeneity model. Both results illustrate that the general homogeneity 
model has stronger explanatory power and more reliable predictability in farmland pricing. 
   Conclusions 
In the article, we develop a general homogeneity model to enhance model robustness against risk 
aversion  coefficient  misspecification  in  the  traditional  C-CAPM  model.  We  find  that  US 
farmland data support a nonlinear functional form rather than a linear form for consumption. We 
also find that both farmland returns and consumers’ wealth levels are determinates for farmland 
assets value. Our model generates better out-of-sample predictions and our results are robust to 
estimation methods. It provides empirical evidence of the effects of transaction costs and risk 
aversion on farmland prices. 
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   Table 1. Descriptive Statistics, 1950-2008           
Variable  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  Skewness  Kurtosis  Autocorrelation 
Coefficient 
     1 in 1982 84)  0.9121  0.6154  0.2410  2.1530  0.4794  -1.2501  0.9996 
   billion dollars)  69.2605  16.0702  41.9507  123.3692  0.9209  1.3116  0.8146 
    million acres)  1056.0200  94.6592  919.9000  1206.3550  0.2190  -1.3532  0.9993 
   (1,000 $/acres)  0.5945  0.5087  0.0650  2.1700  1.1522  1.1551  0.9959 
   (billion dollars)  605.1680  448.2733  151.9045  1841.2120  0.9933  0.5685  0.9939 
    1.1597  0.0734  0.9599  1.4166  0.0929  2.6367  0.6270 
  /   (1,000 $/acre)  0.0313  0.0229  0.0091  0.0947  1.0584  0.4011  0.9260 
    0.0509  0.0264  0.0092  0.1316  0.7596  0.5695  0.8809 
Note: Number of observations is 59.             
 
 
Table 2. GMM Estimation Results, 1950-2008         
  Linear Homogeneity    General Homogeneity 
            Estimate           Std. 
Error 
              t-
Ratio 
           Estimate           Std. 
Error 
              t-
Ratio 
ρ  0.7547  0.0807  9.3482    0.9586  0.0429  22.3410 
   0.9701  0.1115  8.6969    1.0185  0.0038  267.6441 
β  0.9726  0.1279  7.6027    0.9558  0.0051  186.3042 
    0.0084  0.0145  0.5814    -0.0074  0.0045  -1.6315 
    0.2062  0.2318  0.8895    0.1136  0.0568  2.0008 
α  0.7321  0.1323  5.5316    0.9763  0.0423  23.0554 
λ  Set to 1              -               -    0.8277  0.0034  241.1212 
J-stat  0.1085        0.2460     
     equation (a)  0.5174        0.5010     
     equation (b)  0.2345        0.3350     
Note: The t-ratios are obtained under the null Ho:    0. The Linear Homogeneity parameters are estimated from equations (30a) and (30b), while the General Homogeneity 
parameters are estimated from equations (29a) and (29b). 
 
    
Table 3. GMM, ML, and 3SLS Estimations for General Homogeneity Model, 1950-2008 
  GMM    ML    3SLS 
  Estimate  Std. Error  Wald-Stat    Estimate  Std. Error  Wald-Stat    Estimate  Std. Error  Wald-Stat 
ρ  0.9586  0.0429  497.5111    0.9802  0.0164  3555.4680    0.9566  0.1168  66.8666 
   1.0185  0.0038  71633.3834    0.9994  0.0028  126495.9    1.0153  0.0105  9301.2505 
β  0.9558  0.0051  33405.0900    0.9807  0.0063  24616.1600    0.9479  0.0193  2419.7650 
    -0.0074  0.0045  2.6616    -0.0003  0.0035  0.0077    -0.0226  0.0201  1.2623 
    0.1136  0.0568  4.0033    0.0142  0.3551  0.0016    -0.0604  0.1887  0.1025 
α  0.9763  0.0423  529.8373    0.9796  0.0168  3398.8210    0.9712  0.1196  65.7352 
λ  0.8277  0.0034  58139.4400    0.8286  0.0000  1.45E+27    0.8280  0.0065  16136.9487 
Note:  For the Wald tests the critical values of   
    are 2.71, 3.84, 6.63, and 10.83 for a 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% significance level, respectively. All three estimations are obtained from equations (29a) 
and (29b). 
 
Table 4. Hypothesis Testing, 1950-2008 
       Linear Homogeneity    General Homogeneity 
  Test Statistic            p-Value    Test Statistic       p-Value 
Overidentifying restrictions                         (Hansen test)  x  5   0.1085  0.9998       8   0.2460  0.9999 
No transaction costs                                              0   x  2   1.0923  0.5792       2   13.8794  0.0010 
Symmetric transaction costs                                        x  1   0.7284  0.3934       1   4.9195  0.0266 
Expected utility                                                             1   x  1   0.0718  0.7887       1   23.5875  0.0000 
Infinite intertemporal elasticity of substitution     1   x  1   8.1808  0.0042       1   1.0028  0.3166 
0 rate of time preference                                           1   x  1   0.0007  0.9790       1   147.7758  0.0000 
Risk neutrality                                                           α   1   x  1   3.6801  0.0551       1   0.3564  0.5505 
Linear Homogeneity                                                    1      1                        -       1   2518.3218  0.0000 
Note: The Linear Homogeneity parameters are estimated from equations (30a) and (30b), while the General Homogeneity parameters are estimated from equations (29a) and (29b). 
 
 
   Figure 1. Homogeneity Test for Linear Homogeneity Model and General Homogeneity Model 
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